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Abstract—Zero-knowledge proofs have always provided a clear
solution when it comes to conveying information from a prover
to a verifier or vice versa without revealing essential information
about the process. Advancements in zero-knowledge have helped
develop proofs which are succinct and provide non-interactive
arguments of knowledge along with maintaining the zero-
knowledge criteria. zk-SNARKs (Zero knowledge Succinct Non-
Interactive Argument of Knowledge) are one such method that
outshines itself when it comes to advancement of zero-knowledge
proofs. The underlying principle of the Zcash algorithm is such
that it delivers a full-fledged ledger-based digital currency with
strong privacy guarantees and the root of ensuring privacy lies
fully on the construction of a proper zk-SNARK. In this paper
we elaborate and construct a concrete zk-SNARK proof from
scratch and explain its role in the Zcash algorithm.
Index Terms—zk-SNARKs, Zcash, Blockchain, R1CS,
QAP/QSP
I. INTRODUCTION
The first digital currency that attained worldwide recogni-
tion was Bitcoin, which was developed on the fact that it did
not require a trusted third party. Contrary to the traditional
e-cash schemes [1] [2], Bitcoin used a distributed ledger
called a blockchain to store transactions. However Bitcoin
is a “pseudo-anonymous” scheme and does not provide for
full anonymity of the participants. In 2013 Miers et al.
proposed Zerocoin [3] which extended the Bitcoin scheme
by providing strong guarantees for anonymity. Zerocoin uses
zero-knowledge proofs like many other e-cash protocols [4].
However, there were a few issues which existed with Zerocoin
protocol: 1) The scheme only provided partial anonymity as
it did not hide the amount or other important data in the
transaction ledger but only hid the origin address; 2) The coins
used had only fixed denominations; 3) The users could not pay
each other directly using Zerocoins.
To address the above issues of both Bitcoin and Zerocoin,
the Zerocash1 algorithm was proposed by Ben-Sasson et
al. [5]. The concept of a decentralized anonymous payment
scheme was introduced in Zcash which fundamentally provide
the functionality and security guarantees and also ensures
strong anonymity. The construction of the Zcash protocol is
dependent on recent advances in zero-knowledge proofs, and
specifically, zk-SNARKs [6] [7] [8]. Advancing further from
1Zcash is the implementation of Zerocash and in this paper we will make
use of the term Zcash
naive zero-knowledge, a zk-SNARK helps provide succinct-
ness and a non-interactive argument of knowledge in the Zcash
algorithm.
A. Overview of Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
An NP language is a set of strings L such that if a string
γ belongs to the language L, then there exists a string α, a
witness that γ belongs to L, that allows the membership of
γ ∈ L to be verified in polynomial time. We can thus define a
polynomial-time computable relation P such that P (γ, α) = 1
if γ ∈ L and α is a valid witness for γ. A non-interactive
zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for an NP language
L allows a prover to convince a verifier that it has knowledge
α that a given γ belongs to L without revealing anything about
α to the verifier. Non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of
knowledge require a common reference string. The zk-SNARK
schemes we examine in this paper are examples of an non-
interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for NP that
also achieves succinctness; that is, that the size of proof is
essentially independent of the witness size (up to logarithmic
factors in practice). However the security of these schemes
are based on non-falsifiable assumptions such as knowledge
(extraction) assumptions. The background idea used in Zcash
while constructing the zk-SNARK is taken from the Pinocchio
Protocol [9] which is a nearly practical verifiable computation
protocol.
Fig. 1. Conversion From Code to zk-SNARKs
Figure 1 illustrates the steps required to convert a piece
of computer code into a zk-SNARK. In this paper we deal
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with each step in detail so as to give the reader a clear
understanding of the inner workings of the zero knowledge
protocol. Our work elaborates how code is converted to an
algebraic circuit, which in turn gets converted to a Rank 1
Constraint System (R1CS) [10]. A R1CS is then converted
to a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP)/Quadratic Span
Program (QSP) [11], and as a last step, a zk-SNARK proof is
generated.
II. STEPS TO CREATE A ZK-SNARK PROOF
In a zero-knowledge proof, we can think of some program
P which takes as input a public input value γ and witness
α, and outputs either 0 or 1. There are two main entities
in this scenario: a prover and a verifier. Both prover and
verifier know the public input γ. The prover has some special
knowledge, also known as the witness α, such that P(γ, α) = 1.
Considering an example where P is a sample cubic polynomial
(derived from the Universal Circuit) as shown in Equation (1):
x3 + x+ 5 == 35 (1)
The above example and the idea for creating a simple zk-
SNARK proof which we explain in this section (till subsection
II-E) was inspired by Vitalik Buterin’s blog [12]. The prover
knows the proving polynomial (encrypted as the proving key),
the witness and the public input. The verifier knows the
public input, the zk-SNARK proof and the target polynomial
(encrypted as verification key) to check whether prover has
the correct polynomial (and hence the correct witness) or not.
Basic algebra can be used to find that the value satisfying the
equation is 3. The main job of the prover is to prove that the
function f (defined in Section II-B) is executed correctly. In
this scenario it is evident that the value of the witness α is 3,
the value of P is the polynomial created in Equation (1), the
target polynomial T is the polynomial form of Equation (9)
and the public input γ is 35.
A. High-Level Code
A first step to any solution is to start with the high-level code
representation of the problem in a programming language like
C or Python. Translating Equation (1) into Python code we get
the code snippet for the function definition of the polynomial
equation.
def f ( x ) :
y = x **3
re turn x + y + 5
B. Algebraic Circuit
The second step is the simple flattening procedure wherein
we convert the high-level code into a series of statements
which contains expressions of the form: x = y or maybe
x = y(op)z. Here the value op can be an addition, subtraction,
multiplication or division operator, and y and z can be
variables or numbers, or even further sub-expressions. Each
of the statements after code flattening can be thought of as a
gate in the algebraic circuit. After the flattening procedure we
obtain the following:
sym1 = x ∗ x
y = sym1 ∗ x
sym2 = y + x
out = sym2 + 5
We observe that the flattened code and the original code are
exactly the same. However we have now increased the number
of lines and operators to form trivial algebraic gates. We can
now represent the above flattened code as a system of gates
as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Algebraic Circuit Representation of the Flattened Code
C. Rank 1 Constraint System
Next we convert the algebraic circuit into something called a
Rank-1 constraint system (R1CS) [10]. A R1CS is a sequence
of groups of three vectors (v, w, k) where the solution to the
R1CS is a vector t such that it satisfies the equation:
t.v ∗ t.w − t.k = 0 (2)
Where (.) represents the dot product of the vectors. In
simpler terms, if we join together v and t, i.e. multiply the
two values in the same positions and then take the sum of
these products, then repeat the same to w and t and then k
and t, then the third result equals the product of the first two
results. A satisfied R1CS is shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Satisfied R1CS System
The value of the vector t is [1, 3, 35, 9, 27, 30], which
ensures a satisfied R1CS system. Instead of having just one
constraint, we are going to have many constraints: one for
each algebraic gate. There is a standard way of converting a
gate into a (v, w, k) triple depending on what the operation
is (+, -, * or /), and whether the arguments are variables or
numbers. The length of each vector is equal to the total number
of variables in the system. This includes a dummy variable one
at the first index representing the number 1, the input variables,
a dummy variable out representing the output, and then all of
the intermediate variables (sym1 and sym2 as above). The
vectors are generally going to be very sparse, only filling in
the slots corresponding to the variables that are affected by
some particular algebraic gate. The mapping we use is:
[one, x, out, sym1, y, sym2]
The solution vector consists of assignments for all of these
variables, in the above given order. The triple (v, w, k) for the
first gate in Figure 2 is given as:
v = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
w = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
y = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0]
So, the solution t = [1, 3, 0, 9, 0, 0] indeed satisfies Equation
(2). We assume that the solution vector has 3 in the second
position and 9 in the fourth position, which satisfies the dot
product 3 ∗ 3 = 9. If the value in the second position would
have been −3; then also it would have passed having 9 in the
fourth position as (−3) ∗ (−3) is also 9. In reality, 7 in the
second position and 49 in the fourth position will also hold
true because the purpose of the first check is just to verify
consistency of the inputs and outputs in our case for the first
multiplication gate only. Taking the second gate in Figure 2 we
check y = sym1 ∗x. So the triple (v, w, k) will be calculated
in a similar fashion:
v = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0]
w = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
y = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
The solution t = [1, 3, 0, 9, 27, 0] again satisfies Equation (2).
Considering the third gate now:
v = [0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]
w = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
y = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
The solution t = [1, 3, 0, 9, 27, 30] satisfies Equation (2). In
this case, the pattern is somewhat different. Its multiplying
the first element in the solution vector by the second element,
then adding the fifth element to the results, and checking if the
sum equals the sixth element. Because the first element in the
solution vector is always one, this is just an addition check,
checking that the output equals the sum of the two inputs.
Lastly for the fourth gate we have:
v = [5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
w = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
y = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
The final solution becomes t = [1, 3, 35, 9, 27, 30] which
satisfies Equation (2). We are evaluating the check, out =
sym2 + 5 in the fourth gate. The dot product check works
by taking the sixth element in the solution vector, adding five
times the first element (Note: the first element is 1, so this
effectively means adding 5), and checking it against the third
element, which is where we store the output variable.
Finally we have our R1CS with four constraints (i.e. for four
logic gates). This is the witness which is the assignment of
all variables, including input, output and internal variables:
t = [1, 3, 35, 9, 27, 30]. The final R1CS is:
V [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0][0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0][0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0][5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1];
W [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0][0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0][1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0][1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0];
Y [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0][0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0][0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1][0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0];
(3)
D. Converting R1CS to Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
In this step we take the R1CS and convert it into a
Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP) [11], where we use
similar concepts but use polynomials instead of dot products.
In R1CS there are four groups of three vectors of length six.
In a QAP, this gets converted to six groups of three degree-
3 polynomials, where evaluating the polynomials at each x
coordinate represents one of the constraints, and we have four
in our example as there are four gates). The main idea is that
if we evaluate the polynomials at x = 1, we get our first set
of vectors. If we then evaluate the polynomials at x = 2, we
get our second set of vectors etc. This transformation can be
made using Lagrange Interpolation [13]. The problem that a
Lagrange interpolation solves is that if you have a set of points
(i.e. {x, y} coordinate pairs), then doing a Lagrange interpola-
tion on those points gives you a polynomial that passes through
all of those points. This is done by decomposing the problem.
For each x coordinate, we create a polynomial that has the
desired y coordinate at that x coordinate and a y coordinate
of 0 at all the other x coordinates we are interested in. To
get the final result we add all of the polynomials together. In
mathematical terms, we explained the entire process for the v
vector. The goal is to construct v1(x) which is the first of the
six polynomials in V . Initially we will be using the formula
to create the y values, i.e. the function points for Lagrange
interpolation.
vj(i) = V [i][j] (4)
In Equation (4), the value i is the vector index and j is the
position index in each vector for V group in Equation (3).The
x values are defined as 1 ≤ x ≤ 4. Using Equation (3) we get
the y values as:
v1(1) = 0
v1(2) = 0
v1(3) = 0
v1(4) = 5
We already know the x values as 1, 2, 3, 4. Using Lagrange
interpolation formula [13]:
v1(x) = 5 ∗ (x− 1)
4− 1
(x− 2)
4− 2
(x− 3)
4− 3 (5)
Solving Equation (5):
v1(x) =
5
6
x3 − 5x2 + 55
6
x− 5
Which can be also written in decimal form for ease of
calculation as:
v1(x) = 0.833x
3 − 5x2 + 9.166x− 5
In similar way, we calculate v2(x), v3(x), v4(x), v5(x), v6(x)
which sums up the entire V group. After that we repeat the
same for the W group and K group in Equation (3). The six
polynomials for the V group looks like:
V
[−5.0, 9.166,−5.0, 0.833]
[8.0,−11.333, 5.0,−0.666]
[0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
[−6.0, 9.5,−4.0, 0.5]
[4.0,−7.0, 3.5,−0.5]
[−1.0, 1.833,−1.0, 0.166]
Similarly we get six set of polynomials for W group and
the K group respectively. This set of (V,W,K) polynomials
(plus a Z polynomial which is explained later) makes up the
parameters for this particular QAP instance. Note that all of the
work up until this point needs to be done only once for every
function that one is trying to use zk-SNARKs to verify (such
as in the case of a token transfer). Once the QAP parameters
are generated, they can always be reused for that transaction.
If we try to evaluate the polynomials at x = 1 we should get
the set of (v, w, k) vectors for the first logic gate.
V results at x = 1 : [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
W results at x = 1 : [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0]
K results at x = 1 : [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0]
These values are exactly same as the first logic gate R1CS
values. This property holds for all other values of x as well.
E. Need for Conversion
We need to convert R1CS to QAP so that we can check
all the constraints simultaneously instead of checking the
constraints in R1CS individually. We can now check all of
the constraints at the same time by evaluating the dot product
check on the polynomials. For ease of calculations let us
consider V (x) ∗W (x)−K(x) as S (also known as the target
polynomial). Here, V (x) is:
[t(1)] ∗ v1(x)
+
[t(2)] ∗ v2(x)
.
.
[t(6)] ∗ v6(x)
(6)
Where t is defined earlier as [1, 3, 35, 9, 27, 30]. We repeat the
same to get W (x) and K(x) in a similar fashion as designed
in Equation (6). The goal is to find a polynomial H such that
the equation:
S = H ∗ Z(X) (7)
Such that the division S/Z leaves no remainder. The value Z
is defined as the minimal simplest polynomial that is equal to
zero at all points that correspond to logic gates. In this case
we have four gates, so value of Z becomes (x−1)∗ (x−2)∗
(x − 3) ∗ (x − 4). Performing polynomial multiplication we
get:
V (x) = [43.0,−73.333, 38.5,−5.166]
W (x) = [−3.0, 10.333,−5.0, 0.666]
K(x) = [−41.0, 71.666,−24.5, 2.833]
(8)
Using the Equation (8), we get the value of S = V (x) ∗
W (x)−K(x) as:
S = [−88.0, 592.666,−1063.777, 805.833,
−294.777, 51.5,−3.444] (9)
Where −3.444 is the coefficient of x6 term, 51.5 is the
coefficient x5 term and so on. Z is evaluated as:
Z = [24,−50, 35,−10, 1] (10)
Using (9) and (10):
H = S/Z = [−3.666, 17.055,−3.444]
Which means H = −3.444x2 + 17.055x − 3.666, and there
is no remainder after the long division is performed.
F. zk-SNARKs
Having generated the zk-SNARK proof, we now address
the verification part of the process. The prover has derived the
polynomials H and Z as explained in Section II-E using the
polynomial f(x). Hence, the zk-SNARK proof is an encrypted
tuple pi, where pi = [gH , gZ ]. The prover adds the value of pi
onto the public parameters2 string. The verifier obtains the
proof pi, the public input γ and the target polynomial T (en-
crypted as the verification key - gT ) from the ppar string. The
verifier knows only the public input γ but not the polynomial
f(x). Therefore, we use the concept of Homomorphic Hiding
[14] for the blind evaluation of a polynomial. Using Homo-
morphic Hiding (see Section II-F1) and the ECIES encryption
scheme (see section II-F2) [15], the verifier calculates the val-
ues of E(1), E(γ), E(γ2), E(γ3), E(γ4), E(γ5), E(γ6). The
verifier then computes the values of E(H(γ)) ∗E(Z(γ)) (the
verifier received [gH , gZ ] from the proof) along with the value
of E(T (γ)). This can be easily done because the encryption
E supports linear combinations. The values H(γ), Z(γ) and
T (γ) are a linear combination of 1, γ, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5, γ6. If
the value of E(H(γ)) ∗ E(Z(γ)) (received from the proof)
matches the value of E(T (γ)) (target polynomial received
as the verification key), then the verifier is convinced that
the prover knows the right polynomial, and hence the right
witness. Given for a field F, a zk-SNARK for F-arithmetic
circuit satisfiability is a triple of polynomial time algorithms
(KeyGen, Prove, Verify). In Zcash, zK-SNARKs based on QAP
are the main basis of construction; as this provides a linear
time KeyGen function, quasi-linear time Prove function and
linear time Verify function.
1) Homomorphic Hiding: We have defined E(x) as gx;
where g is a generator of a group with a hard discrete log
problem. Homomorphic Hiding supports addition in the sense
that E(x+ y) can be calculated from E(x) and E(y); which
means for the linear combinations of polynomials we obtain:
E(ax+by) = gax+by = gaxgby = (gx)a(gy)b = E(x)aE(y)b
2) ECIES - Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme:
During the encryption phase in this scheme, the public key
of the receiver and the original message (to be encrypted) are
taken as inputs. It results in an output string that consists of
the public key of the sender, the encrypted message and a
MAC (to check the authenticity of the sender) tag [16]. The
decryption phase takes as input the private key of the receiver
and the output string of the encryption phase. The resulting
output after decryption is the original message.
III. ROLE OF ZK-SNARKS IN ZCASH
Finally, we elaborate on how the entire zk-SNARK mech-
anism (as explained in Section II) can work in a Zcash
transaction [9]. Figure 4 illustrates the six steps that is involved
in any Zcash transaction.
2Henceforth the public parameters will be denoted as ppar
Fig. 4. Steps Involved in a Zcash Transaction
The zk-SNARK proofs are usually generated in the Pour-
ing Coins phase [5]. Initially, we have a random security
parameter λ, which is a unary representation of higher order
prime number (i.e, 1prime) and a Universal Circuit C (usually
a million gated circuit in Zcash). During the System Setup
phase, using the value of C and λ, the KeyGen function [17],
[18] samples the proving key (encrypted proving polynomial)
and the verification key (encrypted target polynomial) as
the output. This is done using the RSA [19] protocol by
the Trusted Third Party [20], [21]. These are stored in the
ppar string which can then be easily accessed by both the
prover and the verifier (since the ppar string is stored on the
Blockchain). Note: Since Zcash employs zk-SNARKs for its
knowledge construction, it implies that Zcash is essentially a
publicly verifiable mechanism [5], [9] and hence anyone can
be the verifier.
In the Creating Payment Address phase, the public en-
cryption scheme (ECIES encryption which is a part of ppar
string) is used to create a public key and a secret key for a
single user. These keys are in turn as used in conjunction with
a pseudo-random function3 [22] (PRF with a seed value) to
generate a (public key, private key) address pair.
Next comes the Minting Coins phase where, as the name
suggests, new coins are minted from a user’s non-anonymous
Bitcoin addresses. The inputs are the ppar string, the max
value of a coin and the public key address (output of the
Creating Payment Address phase) where the newly minted
coin will be stored. This phase provides an output tuple which
stores the coin value, the public address of the coin and
the coin commitment schemes [23] created using randomly
sampled trapdoors [24] (based on a PRF using the coin serial
number).
Following the Minting Coins phase we get to the Pouring
Coins phase which is basically used to pour the values of old
coins into new coins, thus ensuring that the old coins have
been used. This phase takes as input n (in Zcash algorithm
the value of n is 2) distinct coins and their n distinct secret
key addresses. It also takes as input the ppar string, the Merkle
tree4 [25], [26] root (to the ensure that the n coins have
been minted), and also n authentication paths for the n coin
3A PRF or pseudo-random function is an efficient deterministic function
computed in polynomial time based on a seed value
4A Merkle tree is a binary tree where every leaf node is a block of data
(a cryptographic hash), and every internal node (including the root) acts as a
marker which contains the address (also a cryptographic hash) of its children
commitments5 [23] (cm1(cold1 ), cm2(c
old
2 )..., cmn(c
old
n )). The
new input values of the new n coins and their public key
addresses are additionally taken as inputs. Internally during the
Pouring Coins phase, the prover executes the Prove function
and generates the zk-SNARK proof using the proving key,
the witness and the public input (all part of the ppar string).
The zk-SNARK proof goes onto the transaction ledger of the
POUR function. This transaction ledger and the new n coins
are stored as the output.
Subsequently in the Verifying Transactions phase, the
verifier either verifies the Minting coin transaction ledger or
the POUR transaction ledger. This phase takes as input the
ppar string, either the MINT or the POUR transaction ledger
and a current Ledger. If the input is the MINT transaction
ledger, then the Verifier just checks whether the committed
coins have the same value as claimed by the Prover. If the
input is the POUR transaction ledger, the Verifier executes the
Verify function using the zk-SNARK proof as stored inside the
POUR ledger, the verification key and the public input (part of
the ppar string). The Verify function returns a Boolean value
depending on whether the verifier is convinced that prover’s
assertion is genuine. If the verifier is convinced of the zk-
SNARK proof and that the digital signature6 [19], [27] is valid,
the Verifying Transactions phase returns TRUE. Note: This
phase can also return a FALSE value if the old serial number
of coins are present on the current ledger, or the Merkle tree
root [25] is not present on the current ledger, as this would
mean a user is trying to re-use spent coins.
Finally, we have the Receiving Coins phase. In this phase
the receiver is a user with an address pair (public & private
key) that wants to receive payments to be sent to the public
key address. To do so one first scans the current ledger. For
every payment to the public key address, the receiver receives
coins whose serial number do not appear on the current ledger
(i.e, this ensures that receiver receives only unspent coins).
To spend the received coins one needs to use the POUR
algorithm, thus creating the whole need to form a zk-SNARK
proof, and subsequently the need to verify the proof to ensure
that a user is not re-using old (already spent) coins repeatedly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The method explained in this paper is the fundamental
basis used in the construction of zk-SNARK proofs in the
Zcash [5] paper. It elaborates on the fact that the verifier is
thinking of a right polynomial, and wants to check whether
the prover knows it. The prover generates a zk-SNARK proof
from the proving key supplied by the public parameters string,
along with the witness and the public input. The verifier
has the target polynomial (from public parameters string as
verification key) with which to verify the proof. Therefore,
if the prover does not have the correct proving polynomial
they will add a wrong proof to the public parameter string.
5The coin commitment scheme COMM is such that, to reveal the coin
commitment cm for a value a we only need to know the value a and trapdoor
b. Thus cm = COMMb(a)
6The ECDSA digital signature scheme is used
So, it is very easy for the verifier to verify whether the prover
knows the right proving polynomial or not, without the verifier
actually knowing the polynomial itself.
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